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Abstract
The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered un-
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sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is that the relative
interiors of the risk adjusted sets of expectations overlap. This condition
is necessary if agents are not risk neutral at extreme levels of wealths ei-
ther positive or negative. It is equivalent to the condition that there does
not exist mutually compatible trades, with non negative expected value
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1 Introduction
The issue of the relationship between agents beliefs and risk tolerances and the
existence of efficient allocations and equilibria has first been considered, in the
early seventies, by Grandmont [20], Green [21] ) and Hart [24] for markets with
short-selling in the context of temporary equilibrium models and assets equi-
librium models and reconsidered later by Hammond [22] and Page [33], [34].
In these early models, investors were assumed to have a single homogeneous or
heterogeneous probabilistic belief and be von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM),
risk averse utility maximizers. Two sufficient conditions for existence of an
equilibrium were given:
- the overlapping expectations condition which expresses that investors are suf-
ficiently similar in their beliefs and risk tolerances so that there exists a non
empty set of prices (the no-arbitrage prices) for which no agent can make cost-
less unbounded vNM utility nondecreasing purchases (see Hammond [22], Page
[33], [34]),
-the no unbounded utility arbitrage condition, a condition of absence of collec-
tive arbitrage, which requires that investors do not engage in mutually compat-
ible, utility nondecreasing trades (see Hart [24], Page [34], Nielsen [32]).
These conditions were shown to be equivalent under adequate assumptions and
necessary for existence of equilibrium (see e.g. Page [34], Page and Wooders
[36]) under further assumptions.
The problem of existence of equilibria with consumption sets unbounded below
has been extended to abstract economies and the assumptions mentioned above
generalized (see Werner [41] and Nielsen [32]). For a review of the subject in
finite dimension, see Allouch et al [1], Dana et al [12], Page [33],[35]. The theory
has also been developped in infinite dimension (see Brown and Werner [8] and
Dana et al [13] for some of the difficulties encountered). Finally, since the early
work of Artzner et ali [2], for the last ten years, the problem of quantifying the
risk of a financial position has been very popular in finance (see Fo¨llmer and
Schied [16] for an overview) and has led to the concept of convex measure of
risk. Risk sharing of an aggregate capital betwen different units or different
investors gives rise to problems of efficiency with shortselling in finite or infi-
nite dimension (see for example, Heath and Ku [25], Dana and Le Van [14] for
the finite dimension, Barrieu and El Karoui [4], Burgert and Ru¨schendorf [5],
Filipovic and Kupper [17], Filipovic and Svindland [18] and Jouini et al [26],
for the infinite dimension).
This paper reconsiders the equilibrium theory of assets with short-selling
when there is risk and ambiguity. The variational preferences axiomatized by
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [29] (denoted MMR from now on) are
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used. Variational preferences nest many of the models developed to study
ambiguity in the decision theoretic, financial and economic literatures, in par-
ticular, the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler [19], the penalty
preference functionals of Hansen and Sargent [23] and the convex measures of
risk introduced in mathematical finance. A risk averse variational preference
is characterized by a convex cost (penalty) function defined on the probability
simplex and a concave utility index that models risk-aversion. Up to a minus
sign, convex measures of risk correspond to a risk neutral agent with a zero
discount rate. Without loss of generality, attention may be restricted to the
probabilities with finite cost that we call the priors. To simplify as much as
possible the analysis, we assume complete markets and consider a standard
Arrow-Debreu model of state contingent claims.
The first contribution of the paper is the characterization, for MMR prefer-
ences, of all the basic concepts of the theory of equilibrium with short-selling,
the useful and useless trading directions, the no-arbitrage (weak no-arbitrage)
prices, the concepts of collective absence of arbitrage, in terms of sets of priors
which, in the financial tradition, we call the risk adjusted sets of priors. These
sets contain two types of information, the beliefs of the agents and the intensity
of their risk aversion. When an agent is risk neutral, her risk adjusted set of
priors equals her set of priors but in general, it strictly contains it. The more
ambiguous and the more risk averse the agent, the larger it is. The second con-
tribution of the paper is to provide under the no half-line (weak no half-line)
condition, necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the risk adjusted set
of priors, for existence of efficient allocations or of equilibria. A necessary and
sufficient condition is that the intersection of the relative interiors of the risk
adjusted set of priors be non empty. It is equivalent to the inexistence of mutu-
ally compatible trades with non negative expectations with respect to any risk
adjusted prior, strictly positive for some agent and some prior. As a corollary,
we obtain that the more ambiguous and the more risk averse the agents and the
more likely is an equilibrium to exist. When the no half-line condition is not
fulfilled (for example some agent is an expected utlity maximizer with constant
marginal utilities at extreme levels of wealths), a set of necessary conditions for
existence of efficient allocations is provided as well as a set of sufficient condi-
tions.
The condition that the intersection of the relative interiors of the risk ad-
justed set of priors is non empty generalizes the conditions given in the early
seventies for single beliefs. An equilibrium does not exist if agents disagree
”very much”. This happens if for example some agents give no weight what-
ever prior they use to disjoint subsets of the states of the world. Agents must
3
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2008.39 (Version révisée)
have sets of priors with overlapping supports, where by support, we mean a state
of the world which has a strictly positive probability for some prior. Unfortu-
nately, even when this condition is fulfilled, there may not be an equilibrium if
their sets of priors are too different. However when agents are very risk averse,
strong disagreement on expectations may be compatible with the existence of
an equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces variational prefer-
ences and standard concepts in equilibrium theory. Section 3 recalls and char-
acterizes for MMR agents, the concepts of useful and useless trading directions,
that of a no-arbitrage price (weak no-arbitrage price) and of collective absence
of arbitrage. Section 4 deals with existence of efficient allocations and equilib-
ria. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under the assumption of
no half-line (weak no half-line). When there is a half-line, sufficient conditions
as well as necessary conditions are provided. Some examples are given to show
that the existence of an equilibrium is unrelated to the intersection of agents’
priors being non empty. A section briefly discusses the relationship of this pa-
per with other papers on the characterization of efficiency in the presence of
risk and ambiguity. A last section provides all the proofs that are not given in
the main part of the paper.
2 Variational preferences
2.1 M.M.R. preferences
We consider a standard Arrow-Debreu model of complete contingent security
markets. There are two dates, 0 and 1. At date 0, there is uncertainty about
which state s from a state space Ω = {1, ..., k} will occur at date 1. At date
0, agents who are uncertain about their future endowments trade contingent
claims for date 1. The space of contingent claims is the set of random variables
from Ω → R. The random variable X which equals x1 in state 1, x2 in state
2 and xk in state k, is identified with the vector in X ∈ R
k, X = (x1, . . . , xk).
Let △ = {pi ∈ Rk+ :
∑k
s=1 pis = 1} be the probability simplex in R
k. For a
given pi ∈ △, we denote by Epi(X) :=
∑k
l=1 pilxl the expectation of X. Two
probabilities pi and q such that pi is absolutely continuous with respect to q are
denoted by pi ≪ q, two equivalent probabilities p and pi will be denoted by p ≃ pi.
For pi ∈ P, Ipi = {s | pis > 0}. We denote by int△ = {p ∈ △ | ps > 0 for all s}
and for A ⊆ △, intA = {p ∈ A | ∃ a ball B(p, ε) s.t. B(p, ε) ∩ int △ ⊆ A}.
Finally, for a given price p ∈ Rk, p ·X :=
∑k
l=1 plxl, the price of X.
There arem agents indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m. Agent i has an endowment Ei ∈ Rk
of contingent claims. We denote by (Ei)mi=1 the m-tuple of endowments and
by E =
∑m
i=1E
i aggregate endowment. We assume that each agent has a
4
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preference order  over Rk represented by a utility function V which verify:
there exists a concave, strictly increasing differentiable utility index u : R → R
and a convex lower semi-continuous function c : △ → [0,∞] such that the
utility V : Rk → R is given by
V (X) = min
pi∈△
Epi(u(X)) + c(pi) (1)
Utilities of type (1) have been axiomatized by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rus-
ticchini [29] andy capture risk and uncertainty. Risk aversion is modelled by u
being concave and V1 is more risk averse than V2 if u1 is more risk averse than
u2. From Arrow-Pratt’s theorem, u1 is more risk averse than u2 if and only
if u1 = ψ ◦ u2 for some ψ concave increasing. According to Maccheroni et al
[29], 1 is more ambiguity averse than 2 if and only if u1 = au2 + b for some
a > 0, b ∈ R and c1 ≤ c2 provided u1 = u2. Hence c is an index of ambiguity
aversion.
Variational preferences nest many of the models developed to study ambi-
guity in the decision theoretic, financial and economic literatures, in particular:
• the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler [19]
V (X) = min
pi∈P
Epi(u(X)) (2)
which is obtained for c = δP , an indicator function of a convex compact
subset P of △ (c(pi) = 0 if pi ∈ P and c(pi) =∞ otherwise),
• the multiplier utility used by Hansen and Sargent [23] where
c(pi | p) =
{
θ
∑
s pis log
pis
ps
if pi ≪ p
=∞ otherwise
θ > 0 is a parameter of ambiguity aversion and the cost function pi →∑
s pis log
pis
ps
is the relative entropy between the probabilities pi and p.
Utilities of type (1) also include the monetary utility functions which fulfill (1)
with u(x) = x. The opposite of a monetary utility function is a convex measure
of risk. Monetary utilities with cost function c = δP , the indicator function of
a convex compact subset P of △, V (X) = min
pi∈P
Epi(X) correspond to coherent
measures of risk and will be now on be called coherent monetary utilities.
Let P = dom c = {pi : c(pi) < +∞} be the set of effective priors. Then
V (X) = min
P
Epi(u(X)) + c(pi) (3)
For a fixed u, the more ambiguity aversion, the smaller c and the larger is P .
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3 Useful vectors, no-arbitrage and no-half line con-
cepts
In this section, we recall the concepts of useful and useless trading directions
and characterize the useful (useless) trading directions for a utility of type (3).
We then turn to the concepts of no-arbitrage prices and weak no-arbitrage
prices, as well as concepts of collective absence of arbitrage. We finally define
the no-half line condition.
3.1 Useful vectors
Let V be a utility of type (3). For X ∈ Rk, let
P̂ (X) = {Y ∈ Rk | V (Y ) ≥ V (X)}
be the set of contingent claims preferred to X and let R(X) be its asymptotic
cone (see Rockafellar [39], section 8). Since V is concave, by Rockafellar’s
theorem 8.7 in [39], R(X) is independent of X and called the set of useful
vectors for V . It will be denoted by R. We recall that
R = {W ∈ Rk | V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0}.
The lineality space of V or set of useless vectors is defined by
L = {W ∈ Rk |V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ∈ R} = R ∩ (−R).
Using the concavity of V , we also have:
L = {W ∈ Rk |V (λW ) = V (0), for all λ ∈ R}.
Let us first consider the risk neutral case. For a > 0 and c : △ → [0,∞], let
V (X) = min
P
aEpi(X) + c(pi), a > 0 (4)
The following proposition characterizes the set of useful vectors and the lineality
space for the risk neutral case. The proof may be found in Dana and Le Van
[14].
Proposition 1 Let V fulﬁll (4). We then have
R = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P}
L = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) = 0, for all pi ∈ P}
L = {0} if and only there exists pi ∈ int P .
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It follows from proposition 1 that if the closure of P equals △, then R = Rk+.
This is the case when the cost function is finite for probabilities absolutely con-
tinuous with respect to a strictly positive probability (entropy or Gini index ).
Let us next consider the risk averse case. We first show that V is the
minimum of a family of affine combinations of linear expectations over a set of
priors P˜ which is larger than P . Indeed, since u is concave and differentiable,
u(x) = min
z∈R
{u′(z)x + u(z) − u′(z)z}. (5)
We may therefore characterize V as follows.
Lemma 1 Let V fulﬁll (3) and u be non linear. For any X ∈ Rk, we have
V (X) = min
η
{
(Epiu
′(Z))
{∑
s
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
xs +
γ(η)
Epiu′(Z)
}}
(6)
where η = (pi,Z) ∈ P × Rk and γ(η) = Epiu(Z)− Epi(u
′(Z)Z) + c(pi).
The above representation leads us to introduce a new set of priors which, in the
financial tradition, we call the risk adjusted set of priors,
P˜ =
{
p ∈ △ | ∃ pi ∈ P, Z ∈ Rk s. t. ps =
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
, ∀ s = 1, . . . , k
}
(7)
Next proposition states some of the properties of P˜ . We use the following
notations. Let a = u
′
(+∞) and b = u
′
(−∞) be the asymptotic slopes of u and
t = a
b
be their ratio. Note that t = 0 if and only if a = 0 or b = +∞ while t = 1
if and only if the agent is risk neutral. For an expected utility maximizer, it
follows from Arrow-Pratt’s theorem that t is a measure of risk tolerance: the
more risk averse the agent and the smaller is t.
Proposition 2 1. P ⊆ P˜ . P˜ = P when the agent is risk neutral (t = 1),
when P =int△ or P = △.
2. The set P˜ is convex.
3. If t = 0, then P˜ = {p ∈ △ | ∃pi ∈ P, pi ≃ p}. If moreover, P∩int △ 6= ∅,
then int △ ⊆ P˜ .
4. The more ambiguous and more risk averse the agent and the larger is P˜ .
We may now characterize the useful vectors of an agent with a utility of
type (3). Assertion 1 of the next proposition says that the set of useful vectors
of a risk averse agent with a variational utility and set of priors P is the set
7
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of useful vectors of a risk-neutral agent with a variational utility and set of
priors P˜ . In particular, the set of useful vectors of a risk averse expected utility
maximizer is the set of useful vectors of a risk neutral ambiguous agent with
set of priors, the risk adjusted probabilitys of the prior. Next proposition is an
important step in the characterization of concepts of absence of arbitrage for
MMR utilities.
Proposition 3 Let V fulﬁll (3) with t < 1. Then
1. R = {W ∈ Rk | Ep(W ) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ P˜}
2. If t = 0 and P∩ int△ 6= ∅ or if P¯ = △, then R = Rk+.
3. L = {W ∈ Rk | Ep(W ) = 0, for all p ∈ P˜}. L = {0} iﬀ int P˜ 6= ∅.
It follows from propositions 2 and 3 that for a utility of type (3) the more
ambiguous and the more risk averse the agent, the larger is P˜ , the smaller are
the sets of useful and useless vectors.
Remark 1 One can show (see Appendix) that the condition
Ep(W ) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ P˜ (8)
is equivalent to tEpi(W+)− Epi(W−) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P. (9)
where (W+)l = wl if xl ≥ 0 and (W−)l = −wl if wl ≤ 0. When P is a singleton,
(9) is the incomplete mean condition given by Bertsekas [6] and Hart [24].
3.2 No arbitrage prices
The second concept that we recall is that of a no-arbitrage price, a price for
which no agent can make costless unbounded utility nondecreasing purchases.
Definition 1 A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price” for agent i if
p ·W > 0, for all W ∈ Ri\{0}. A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price”
for the economy if it is a no-arbitrage price for each agent.
For A ⊆ Rd, we denote A0 the polar of A where we recall that A0 = {p ∈
R
d | p · A ≤ 0, for all X ∈ A}.
Let Si denote the set of non arbitrage prices for i. Then Si = −int(Ri)0.
A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price” for the economy if and only if
p ∈ ∩iS
i = −∩iint(R
i)0. From Proposition 3, we may characterize the set of
no-arbitrage prices for agent i and for the economy. A no-arbitrage normalized
price for i is a strictly positive risk adjusted probability in P˜ i that fulfills (10)
below. A no-arbitrage normalized price for the economy is a strictly positive
common risk adjusted probability that fulfills (10) for each i.
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Proposition 4 Let V i fulﬁll (3) for each i. Then
1. the set of no-arbitrage prices for agent i is Si = cone int P˜ i.
2. If ti < 1, p ∈ int P˜ i if and only if
∃ pi ∈ P i ∩ int △, Z ∈ Rk, ∀s, a < u′(zs) < b and ps =
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
. (10)
Hence Si 6= ∅ if and only if P i ∩ int△ 6= ∅.
If ti = 1, then Si 6= ∅ if and only if, int P i 6= ∅
3. The set of no-arbitrage prices for the economy is ∩
i
Si = cone ∩
i
int P˜ i.
4. Let I1 = {i | t
i < 1} and I2 = {i | t
i = 1}. Then ∩
i
Si 6= ∅ if and only
if, for any i ∈ I1, there exists pi
i ∈ P i∩ int △, Zi ∈ Rk with ui
′
(+∞) <
ui
′
(zis) < u
i′(−∞) for all s and pi ∈ ∩i∈I2int P
i such that, for all i ∈
I1, j ∈ I1, s = 1, . . . , k,
piisu
i′(zis)
Epiiu
i′(Zi)
=
pi
j
su
j ′(zjs)
Epiju
j ′(Zj)
= pis
Let us give a few simple sufficient conditions that insure the non-emptiness
of the set of no-arbitrage prices for the economy. A first condition is that agents
have an ”open” set of priors in common, a second is that all agents have some
prior (not necessarely common) that gives positive weight to each state of the
world and are infinitely risk averse.
Corollary 1 1. If ∩iint Pi 6= ∅, then ∩iS
i 6= ∅.
2. If ti = 0 and P i ∩ int∆ 6= ∅ for all i, then ∩iS
i =int Rk+.
From proposition 4 assertion 2, if ti < 1, P i ∩ int△ 6= ∅ is a necessary and
sufficient for the non-emptiness of intP˜ i. When this condition is not satisfied,
there are states of the world that agent i considers as totally unlikely : P i and
P˜ i are in a facet of △ that we next define.
Lemma 2 Let P∩ int △ = ∅, then {l | pil = 0, for all pi ∈ P} 6= ∅.
The set {l | pil = 0, for all pi ∈ P} is the set of states of the world which are
irrelevant for the agent. None of her prior gives positive weight to those states.
Lemma 2 characterizes its non-emptyness. Let GP be its complement, |GP | be
its cardinal and
△GP = {pi ∈ △ |
∑
s∈GP
pis = 1} (11)
be the set of probabilities with support in GP . If P∩ int △ = ∅, by definition of
GP , P ⊆ △GP and P˜ being absolutely continuous with respect to P, P˜ ⊆ △GP .
9
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From proposition 4, Si 6= ∅ if and only if int P˜ i 6= ∅ or equivalently if and
only if Li = {0}. If P i ⊆ △G
Pi
, then Li = {X ∈ Rk, | xl = 0, for all l ∈ GP i}
and is therefore non empty. This leads us to introduce a weaker no-arbitrage
price concept due to Werner [41].
Definition 2 A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” weak no-arbitrage price” for agent
i if p ·W > 0 for all W ∈ Ri\ Li. A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ”weak no-arbitrage
price” for the economy if it is a weak no-arbitrage price for each agent.
If p is a weak no-arbitrage price for i, then for everyW ∈ Ri∩(Li)⊥\{0} and
W ′ ∈ Li, αW +βW ′ ∈ Ri\Li for every α > 0, β ∈ R. Hence p · (αW +βW ′) =
αp ·W + βp ·W ′ > 0 for every α > 0, β ∈ R. Therefore p ·W ′ = 0 for any
W ′ ∈ Li. In other words a ”weak no-arbitrage price” for i gives 0 value to any
useless trade for i. Let Siw denote the set of weak no arbitrage prices for i. We
have the following characterization of Siw where for a convex subset A ⊆ R
p,
the relative interior of A, ri A, is the interior which results when A is regarded
as a subset of its affine hull affA. Let I1 = {i | t
i < 1}, I2 = {i | t
i = 1} be
respectively the set of risk averse and risk neutral agents.
Proposition 5 Let V i fulﬁll (3) for each i. Then
1. Siw = −ri(R
i)0 = cone ri P˜ i.
2. If ti < 1, p ∈ riP˜ i if and only if there exists pii ∈ P i with piis > 0 for
s ∈ GP i , pi
i
s = 0 for s 6∈ GP i
Zi ∈ R|GPi |,∀s ∈ GP i , a
i < ui′(zis) < b
i, ps =
pisu
i′(zis)
Epiu
i′(Zi)
(12)
3. The set of weak no arbitrage prices for the economy is ∩iS
i
w = −∩iri(R
i)0 =
cone ∩i ri P˜
i.
4. ∩iS
i
w 6= ∅ if and only if GP i is independent of i (GP i := G) and for
i ∈ I1, there exists pi
i ∈ P i with piis > 0 for s ∈ G, pi
i
s = 0, for s 6∈ G, Z
i ∈
R
|G| with ui
′
(+∞) < ui
′
(zis) < u
i′(−∞), for all s ∈ G and pi ∈ ∩i∈I2ri
P i, pis > 0 for s ∈ G such that, for all (i, j) ∈ (I1)
2, s ∈ G
piisu
i′(zis)
Epiiu
i′(Zi)
=
pi
j
su
j ′(zjs)
Epiju
j ′(Zj)
= pis
From proposition 5, a necessary condition for existence of weak no-arbitrage
prices is that agents agree on the irrelevant states of the world, those which have
no weight whatever prior they use.
Let us give simple sufficient conditions that insure the non-emptiness of the
set of weak no-arbitrage prices for the economy.
10
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Corollary 2 1. If ∩iri P
i 6= ∅, then ∩iS
i
w 6= ∅.
2. Let GP i = G for all i. If t
i = 0 and P i ∩ ri△G 6= ∅ for all i, then
∩iS
i
w =cone ri△G.
It follows from propositions 4 and 5 that when agents have utilities of type
(3), the more risk averse and the more uncertainty averse are the agents, the
larger are the sets of no-arbitrage and weak no-arbitrage prices.
3.3 Collective absence of arbitrage
We now turn to concepts of collective absence of arbitrage. From now on, a
feasible trade is anm−tupleW 1, . . . ,Wm withW i ∈ Rk for all i and
∑
iW
i = 0.
Let us recall the no-unbounded-arbitrage condition (NUBA) introduced by
Page [34] which requires inexistence of unbounded feasible trades which are
utility nondecreasing and the Weak No-Market-Arbitrage condition (WNMA),
introduced by Hart [24] which requires that feasible trades which are utility
nondecreasing be useless.
Definition 3 1. The economy satisﬁes the NUBA condition if
∑
iW
i = 0
and W i ∈ Ri for all i, implies W i = 0 for all i.
2. The economy satisﬁes WNMA if
∑
iW
i = 0 and W i ∈ Ri for all i implies
W i ∈ Li, for all i.
From proposition 3, we may now characterize the NUBA and WNMA condi-
tions.
Corollary 3 1. NUBA is equivalent to: there exists no feasible tradeW 1, . . . ,Wm
with W i 6= 0 for some i that fulﬁlls Epi(W
i) ≥ 0 for all i and pi ∈ P˜ i.
2. WNMA condition is equivalent to : there exists no feasible tradeW 1, . . . ,Wm
that fulﬁlls Epi(W
i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P˜ i and for all i with a strict inequality
for some i and pi ∈ P˜ i.
In the risk neutral case, the concepts introduced in this section ((weak) non
arbitrage price for an agent and for an economy, the NUBA and WNMA con-
ditions) take a simpler form that may be obtained by taking P i = P˜ i for all i
in propositions 4 and 5 and corollary 3.
3.4 The no-half line condition
Definition 4 Let V fulﬁll (3). A trade W ∈ Rk\{0} is a half-line if there
exists X ∈ Rk such that V (X + λW ) = V (X) for all λ ≥ 0.
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Obviously, if V has no-half line, then it may not have a useless vector. The
next lemma characterizes then no-half line condition in the case of a risk averse
expected utility maximizer and of a risk neutral MMR agent. Sufficient condi-
tions are provided for a risk averse MMR utility to have no-half lines as well as
necessary conditions. We use the following notation: for a given X ∈ Rk, let
P (X) = {pi ∈ P | V (X) = Epi(u(X)) + c(pi)}
be the set of minimizing probabilities at X.
Lemma 3 1. Let V fulﬁll (4). Then V has no-half line if and only if
P (X) ⊆intP for any X ∈ Rk.
2. Let V fulﬁll (3). Assume that P (X) ⊆int△ for any X ∈ Rk and that
a < u′(x) for all x or u′(x) < b for all x (no risk neutrality at inﬁnity).
Then V has no-half line.
3. If V has no-half line, then P (X) ⊆int△ for any X ∈ Rk. If V fulﬁlls (2)
and has no-half line, then P ⊆int△.
4. Let V (X) = Epi(u(X)). Then V has no-half line if and only if pi ∈int△
and a < u′(x) for all x or u′(x) < b for all x.
When there is no risk aversion, the no half-line condition for MMR utilities
is fulfilled for example in the case of entropy but it is not fulfilled for utilities of
the type V (X) = minpi∈P Epi(X), P convex compact since the minimizing prob-
abilities are at the boundary of P . When there is risk aversion, the no half-line
condition is fulfilled for Gilboa-Schmeidler’s utilities, V (X) = minpi∈P E((u(X))
if P ⊆int△ and if the agent is not risk neutral at infinity. For the multiplier
utility with risk aversion, it is fulfilled if the agent is not risk neutral at infinity.
Strictly concave utilities have no half-lines. The strict concavity of V is char-
acterized in lemma 7 in the appendix.
From lemma 3, the no half-line condition implies that P i∩int△ 6= ∅ for all
i. We now consider a weaker condition.
Definition 5 Let V fulﬁll (3) or (4) . A trade W ∈ Rk is a weak half-line if it
is a half-line and it does not belong to L.
As in lemma 3, we obtain:
Lemma 4 1. Let V fulﬁll (4). Then V has no weak half line if and only if
P (X) ⊆riP for any X ∈ Rk.
2. Let V fulﬁll (3). Assume that a < u′(x) for all x or u′(x) < b for all x
(no risk neutrality at inﬁnity) and P (X) ⊆ ri△GP for any X. Then V
has no weak half line.
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4 Existence of efficient allocations and equilibria
4.1 Concepts in equilibrium theory
Let us recall standard concepts in equilibrium theory.
Given (Ei)mi=1, an allocation (X
i)mi=1 ∈ (R
k)m is attainable if
∑m
i=1X
i = E.
The set of individually rational attainable allocations A((Ei)mi=1) is defined by
A((Ei)mi=1) =
{
(Xi)mi=1 ∈ (R
k)m |
m∑
i=1
Xi = E and V i(Xi) ≥ V i(Ei), ∀ i
}
.
The individually rational utility set U((Ei)mi=1) is defined by
U((Ei)mi=1) =
{
(v1, v2, ..., vm) ∈ R
m | ∃X ∈ A((Ei)mi=1) s. t. V
i(Ei) ≤ vi ≤ V
i(Xi), ∀ i
}
.
Definition 6 Given (Ei)mi=1, an attainable allocation (X
i)mi=1 is eﬃcient (or
Pareto optimal) if there does not exist (X ′i)mi=1 attainable such that Vi(X
′
i) ≥
Vi(Xi) for all i with a strict inequality for some i. It is individually rational
eﬃcient if it is eﬃcient and V i(Xi) ≥ V i(Ei) for all i.
Definition 7 A pair (X∗, p∗) ∈ A((Ei)mi=1) × R
k\{0} is a contingent Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium if
1. for each agent i and Xi ∈ Rk, V i(Xi) > V (Xi∗) implies p∗ ·Xi > p∗ ·Xi∗,
2. for each agent i, p∗ ·Xi∗ = p∗ · Ei.
4.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions
We first characterize the existence of efficient allocations and of equilibria under
the condition that the utilities do not contain half-lines (or weak half-lines).
They follow from theorem 1 and 2 in the appendix and propositions 3 4 and 5.
Let I1 = {i | t
i < 1} be the set of risk averse agents and I2 = {i | t
i = 1} the
set of risk neutral agents.
Proposition 6 Let V i fulﬁll (3). Then the following assertions are equivalent:
1. ∩
i
int P˜ i 6= ∅ with P˜ i = P i for any i ∈ I2,
2. For any i ∈ I1, there exist pi
i ∈ P i∩ int △, and Zi ∈ Rk with ai <
ui′(zis) < b
i for all sand pi ∈ ∩i∈I2int P
i such that for all i ∈ I1, j ∈
I1, s = 1, . . . , k, we have
piisu
i′(zis)
Epiiu
i′(Zi)
=
pi
j
su
j ′(zjs)
Epiju
j ′(Zj)
= pis
13
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3. there exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wm with W i 6= 0 for some i and
Epi(W
i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P˜ i and for all i.
Any of the above assertions implies any of the following assertion:
4. there exists an individually rational eﬃcient allocation for any distribution
of initial endowments,
5. there exists an equilibrium for any distribution of initial endowments.
If furthermore V i has no half-line for all i, all these assertions are equivalent
and any equilibrium price is a no-arbitrage price.
We now assume that P i∩int△ = ∅ for some i. From section 3.2, Gc
P i
= {l |
pil = 0, for all pi ∈ P
i} 6= ∅ and Li = {X ∈ Rk | xs = 0, for all s ∈ GP i}. Next
proposition follows from theorem 2 in the appendix and section 3.
Proposition 7 Let V i fulﬁll (3). The following assertions are equivalent:
1. ∩iri(P˜
i) 6= ∅ with P˜ i = P i for any i ∈ I2,
2. GP i = G and for i ∈ I1, there exists pi
i ∈ P i∩ ri△GP , Z
i ∈ R|G| with
ui
′
(+∞) < ui
′
(zis) < u
i′(−∞), for all s ∈ G and pi ∈ ∩i∈I2ri P
i such that,
for all (i, j) ∈ (I1)
2, s ∈ G
piisu
i′(zis)
Epiiu
i′(Zi)
=
pi
j
su
j ′(zjs)
Epiju
j ′(Zj)
= pis
3. there exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wm fulﬁlling Epi(W
i) ≥ 0 for all
pi ∈ P˜ i and for all i with a strict inequality for some i and pi ∈ P˜ i.
Any of the above conditions implies that
4. there exists an individually rational eﬃcient allocation for any distribution
of initial endowments,
5. there exists an equilibrium for any distribution of initial endowments.
If furthermore V i has no weak half-line for all i, all these assertions are equiv-
alent and any equilibrium price is a weak no-arbitrage price.
Remark 2 Under the hypotheses of proposition 7, if there exists an equilibrium
for some distribution of initial endowments, then there exists an equilibrium for
any distribution of initial endowments. Indeed as the equilibrium price is a weak
no-arbitrage price, assertion 1 of proposition 7 is fulﬁlled.
14
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2008.39 (Version révisée)
Proposition 7 may in particular be applied to the case of risk neutral agents
where P˜ i = P i for all i. Restricting attention to statements 1, 3, 4, 5 and assum-
ing furthermore that utilities have no weak half-line for all agents, we obtain
a strengthened version of theorem 1 in Dana and Le Van [14]. It follows from
propositions 6 and 7 that if agents have utilities of type (3), the more risk averse
and the more uncertainty averse are the agents, the more likely are efficient al-
locations to exist.
4.3 Necessary conditions for existence of efficient allocations
This subsection is of interest only if V i has a weak half-line for some i. We give
necessary conditions for existence of an efficient allocations or of an equilibrium
for some aggregate endowment E.
Proposition 8 Let V i fulﬁll (3 ) for each i. If there exists an eﬃcient alloca-
tion for some distributions of endowments (Ei)mi=1, then
1. ∩
i
P˜ i 6= ∅,
2. there exist no feasible trade W 1, . . . , W n fulﬁlling Epi(W
i) > 0, ∀pi ∈ P˜ i,
3. For any distribution of endowments (Ei)mi=1, the individually rational util-
ity set U((Ei)mi=1) is bounded.
4.4 Some examples
The purpose of this subsection is double. Since the necessary and sufficient
conditions that we provided for existence of efficient allocations in propositions
6 and 7 were expressed in terms of the risk adjusted sets of priors, our first
purpose is to provide sufficient conditions for existence of efficient allocations
in terms of priors and utility indices. Our second purpose is to show that the
assumption of a common prior is neither sufficient nor necessary for existence
of efficient allocations.
Corollary 4 Assume that V i fulﬁlls (3) for all i and that ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅. Then
there exists eﬃcient allocations. In particular, if P i is independent of i, there
exists equilibria for any distribution of endowments (Ei)mi=1.
The first assertion follows from corollary 2, the second from the fact that any
convex set has non empty relative interior.
In the previous corollary, we assumed existence of a common prior. The
next proposition shows that if agents are all infinitely risk averse a common
prior is nor sufficient nor necessary for existence of efficient allocations.
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Proposition 9 Assume that V i fulﬁlls (3) with ti = 0 for all i.
1. Assume that P i ∩ int△ 6= ∅ for all i. Then ∩
i
int P˜ i =int△ and there
exists equilibria for any distribution of endowments (Ei)mi=1.
2. Let GP i be independent of i and G = GP i . Assume that P
i ∩ ri△G 6= ∅
for all i. Then there exist equilibria for any distribution of endowments.
The previous proposition applies in particular to the case of agents with single
heterogeneous beliefs.
Corollary 5 Let V i fulﬁll (3) with ti = 0 and P i = {pii} with pii ∈ int△ for
all i and pii 6= pij for all (i, j) Then ∩
i
int P˜ i =int△ and there exists equilibria
for any distribution of endowments (Ei)mi=1.
5 Link with the literature
We end the paper by comparing our existence results for markets with short-
selling and the characterization of efficient allocations for given aggregate en-
dowments that one can obtain without referring to the literature on equilibrium
with shortselling. Let P be a set of prior, X ∈ Rk and let
P˜ (X) =
{
p ∈ △ | ∃ pi ∈ P (X), s. t. ps =
pisu
′(xs)
Epiu′(X)
, ∀ s = 1, . . . , k
}
(13)
be the set of risk adjusted probabilities of the set of minimizing probabities at
X. We may then state:
Proposition 10 Let V i fulﬁll (3) for all i be given. The allocation (X¯i)mi=1 is
eﬃcient for some aggregate endowment E ∈ Rk if any of the equivalent following
conditions are fulﬁlled:
1. ∩
i
P˜ i(X¯i) 6= ∅,
2. there exists no feasible trade (W i)mi=1 such that EpiW
i > 0 for all pi ∈
P˜ i(X¯i) and all i.
Let us first remark that the above characterization was used in proposi-
tion 8 to give necessary condition for existence of efficient allocations for any
distribution of endowments.
Let us next compare assertion 1 of proposition 10 with assertion 2 of propo-
sitions 6 or 7. In proposition 10, the common risk adjusted probability is
minimizing at X¯i for each i. If V i has no half-line and is risk neutral, from
lemma 3 assertion 1, the minimizing probabilities are in int P while if the agent
is risk averse, from assertion 3, they are in int△. In assertion 2 of proposition 6,
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pii ∈intP if the agent is risk neutral and pii ∈int△ if the agent is risk averse but
pii need not be a minimizing probability at Zi. Hence if agents utilities have no
half line, the condition ∩
i
P˜ i(X¯i) 6= ∅ implies that the intersections of the inte-
riors of the risk adjusted priors is non empty and the existence of an allocation
for any distribution of endowments. When utilities have half-lines, assertion 2
of proposition 6 and assertion 1 of proposition 10 are both sufficient conditions
but assertion 1 of proposition 10 depends on (X¯i)mi=1 which is unknown.
The conditions of proposition 10 also characterizes efficiency of interior al-
locations when the set of assets is bounded below (consumption models) and
have been used already in a large number of papers including Billot et ali [7],
Dana [11], [11], Epstein and Wang [15], Kajii and Ui [28], Rigotti and Shannon
[37] and Rigotti et ali [38]. When the set of assets is Rk+, the issue of existence
of equilibrium is a trivial matter. In infinite dimension, existence of efficient
allocations when the set of assets is bounded below is easier to obtain than
existence of equilibria. For a general discussion, see Mas-collel and Zame[31],
for the MEU case, see Dana [11] and Rigotti et ali [38].
The equivalence between the two conditions of proposition 10 and possible
generalizations are also proven in papers on the no-trade: Samet [40], Kajii and
Ui [27], Man-Chung Ng [30].
6 Proofs
6.1 Proof of lemma 1
For any η = (pi,Z), let γ(η) = Epiu(Z)− Epi(u
′(Z)Z) + c(pi). We then have
(Epiu
′(Z))
{∑
s
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
xs +
γ(η)
Epiu′(Z)
}
=
∑
s
pisu
′(zs)xs + γ(pi,Z)
≥ min
pi
{
min
Z
{∑
s
pisu
′(zs)xs + γ(pi,Z)
}}
= min
pi
{∑
s
pisu(xs) + c(pi)
}
= V (X)
where the last equality follows from (5). Hence
min
η
{
(Epiu
′(Z))
{∑
s
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
xs +
γ(η)
Epiu′(Z)
}}
≥ V (X)
Conversely, by definition of γ, we have for any pi ∈ P∑
s
pisu(xs) + c(pi) =
∑
s
pisu
′(xs)xs + γ(pi,X)
≥ min
(pi,Z)
∑
s
pisu
′(zs)xs + γ(pi,Z)
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hence,
V (X) ≥ min
(pi,Z)
∑
s
pisu
′(zs)xs+γ(pi,Z) = min
η
{
(Epiu
′(Z))
{∑
s
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
xs +
γ(η)
Epiu′(Z)
}}
proving lemma 1.
6.2 Proof of proposition 2
To prove that P ⊆ P˜ , it suffices to take Z constant in (7).
To prove assertion 2, let
Q˜ =
{
λ(pisu
′(zs))s ; λ ≥ 0, pi ∈ P,Z ∈ R
k
}
be the cone generated by P˜ . Since P˜ = Q˜ ∩ △, it suffices to prove that Q˜ is
convex. To this end, let λ(pisu
′(zs))s ∈ Q˜, λ
′(pi′s(u
′(z′s))s ∈ Q˜ and α ∈ (0, 1).
Then for any s,
(αλpis + (1− α)λ
′pi′s)u
′(+∞) ≤ αλpisu
′(zs) + (1− α)λ
′pi′su
′(z′s)
≤ (αλpis + (1− α)λ
′pi′s)u
′(−∞).
Hence, there exists ζs which satisfies
(αλpis + (1− α)λ
′pi′s)u
′(ζs) = αλpisu
′(zs) + (1− α)λ
′pi′su
′(z′s).
Define ν = αλpi+(1−α)λ
′pi′
αλ+(1−α)λ′ . Then, ν ∈ P and for any s,
αλpisu
′(zs) + (1− α)λ
′pi′su
′(z′s) = (αλ+ (1− α)λ
′)νsu
′(ζs).
proving the convexity of Q˜.
To prove assertion 3, from its definition P˜ ⊆ {p ∈ △ | ∃pi ∈ P, pi ≃ p}. If
u′(∞) = 0 or u′(−∞) = +∞, then for any p ≃ pi with pi ∈ P , there exists λ > 0
such that
u′(∞) < λ
ps
pis
< u′(−∞)
and thus, there exists Z ∈ Rk such that, for all s ∈ Ipi,
ps
pis
= u
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
, hence
P˜ = {p ∈ △ | ∃pi ∈ P, pi ≃ p}. If there exists pi ∈ P∩ int △, then P˜ contains
int △ the set of strictly positive probabilities which are equivalent to pi.
To prove the last assertion, clearly the more ambiguous the agent, the larger is
P and hence the larger is P˜ . Let us show that the more risk averse the agent,
the larger is P˜ . Indeed, if v is more risk averse than u, then from Arrow’s Pratt
theorem, v = ψ ◦ u with ψ concave. Let P˜u and P˜v be the sets of risk adjusted
priors associated to u and v. Assume that p ∈ P˜u. Then there exists pi and
Z ∈ Rk such that, for all s ∈ Ipi,
u′(+∞) ≤
ps
pis
Epiu
′(Z) ≤ u′(−∞) (14)
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If v′(+∞) = 0 or if v′(−∞) =∞, then from assertion 2,
P˜v = {p ∈ △ | ∃pi ∈ P, pi ≃ p}, hence p ∈ P˜v. Let us therefore assume that
0 < v′(+∞) < v′(−∞) <∞. We first obtain from (14) that
1 ≤
ps
pis
Epiu
′(Z)
u′(+∞)
≤
u′(−∞)
u′(+∞)
Since 0 < v′(+∞) and v′(+∞) = u′(+∞)ψ′(u(+∞)), we have u′(+∞) > 0 and
ψ′u((+∞)) > 0, therefore
v′(−∞)
v′(+∞)
=
ψ′(u(−∞))
ψ′(u(+∞))
u′(−∞)
u′(+∞)
>
u′(−∞)
u′(+∞)
since ψ is concave but not linear on u(R). Hence
1 ≤
ps
pis
Epiu
′(Z)
u′(+∞)
<
v′(−∞)
v′(+∞)
Let λ = v
′(+∞)Epiu′(Z)
u′(+∞) , we obtain that
v′(+∞) < λ
ps
pis
< v′(−∞)
and thus, there exists Z ′ ∈ Rk such that, for all s ∈ Ipi,
ps
pis
= v
′(z′s)
Epiv′(Z′)
which
proves that p ∈ P˜v.
6.3 Proof of proposition 3
We first prove assertion 1. From (6), if W is a useful vector, then for any (pi,Z)
and any λ > 0, we have:
(Epiu
′(Z))
{∑
s
(
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
(λws)
)
+
γ(pi,Z)
Epiu′(Z)
}
≥ V (0).
Dividing by λ and letting λ go to +∞, we obtain:∑
s
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
ws ≥ 0, ∀(pi,Z)
Conversely, if
∑
s
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
ws ≥ 0, ∀(pi,Z), then for any λ > 0,
(Epiu
′(Z))
{∑
s
(
λwspisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
)
+
γ(pi,Z)
Epiu′(Z)
}
≥ γ(pi,Z)
and hence V (λW ) ≥ V (0), ∀λ ≥ 0 and W is useful. Assertion 2 follows from
assertion 3 of proposition 2. Assertion 3 is obvious.
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6.4 Proof of remark 1
(8) is equivalent to
∑
l pilu
′
(xl)wl ≥ 0 for every X ∈ R
k and pi ∈ P . Letting xl
go to +∞ for any l such that wl ≥ 0 and xl go to −∞ ∀ l such that wl < 0 and
dividing by b, we obtain (9). Conversely, since, for any X ∈ Rk and pi ∈ P ,
b
E(u′(X))
∑
l
pilu
′
(xl)wl ≥
b
E(u′(X))
 ∑
{l | wl≥0}
piltwl +
∑
{l | wl<0}
pilwl

(9) implies (8).
6.5 Proof of proposition 4
In order to determine no-arbitrage prices and prove proposition 4, we need to
characterize int P˜ . In the case t = 1, we have intP˜=int P . In the next lemma,
we characterize intP˜ in the case t < 1.
Lemma 5 Let V fulﬁll (3) with t < 1. Then p ∈ intP˜ if and only if it satisﬁes
∃ pi ∈ P ∩ int △, Z ∈ Rk, s.t. ∀s, a < u′(zs) < b, and ps =
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
(10)
Proof : Let us first show that if p satisfies (10), then p ∈ intP˜ . Indeed, we
have ps =
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
for any s. For any ε ∈ R close to 0, we can find z′s such that
ps+ε
1+kε =
pisu
′(z′s)
Epiu′(Z′)
. Indeed, since a < psEpiu
′(Z)
pis
< b for ε small enough, we have
a <
(ps+ε)Epiu′(Z)
pis(1+kε)
< b. Thus there exists z′s such that
(ps+ε)Epiu′(Z)
pis(1+kε)
= u′(z′s). We
then have Epiu
′(Z) = Epiu
′(Z ′) which implies that ps+ε1+kε =
pisu
′(z′s)
Epiu′(Z′)
. In other
words, there exists an open set containing p which is included in P˜ . Hence, p ∈
int P˜ .
Since P˜ is convex, to prove the converse, from Rockafellar’s theorem 6.4, when
int P˜ 6= ∅, p ∈ int P˜ if and only if, for every p′ ∈ P˜ , there exists p” ∈ P˜ such
that p = αp′′ + (1 − α)p′ with α ∈]0, 1[. Consider a p′ that verifies (10). Let
λ′ = 1
Epi′u
′(Z′) and λ
′′ = 1
Epi′′u
′(Z′′) . From the proof of Proposition 2 assertion 2,
we have that ps =
u′(zs)pis
Epi(u′(Z))
with
pis =
αλ′′pi′′s + (1− α)λ
′pi′s
αλ′′ + (1− α)λ′
a < u′(zs) =
αλ′′pi′′su
′(z′′s ) + (1− α)λ
′pi′su
′(z′s)
αλ′′pi′′s + (1− α)λ
′pi′s
< b
Since pi′ ∈ P ∩ int △, pi ∈ P ∩ int △ . Hence (10) is fulfilled.
Let us now prove proposition 4. Given a subset A, let cl A be its closure.
To prove assertion 1, from proposition 3, Ri = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈
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P˜ i}. Hence (Ri)0 is the closed cone generated by P˜ i. Since P˜ i is convex, Si =
int cl cone P˜ i. Since cone P˜ i is convex, int cl cone P˜ i = int cone P˜ i and
Si = int cone P˜ i = cone intP˜ i.
The first part of assertion 2, follows from lemma 5.
To prove that intP˜ i 6= ∅ if and only if P i ∩ int△ 6= ∅, assume first intP˜ i 6= ∅.
From (7), P i ∩ int△ 6= ∅. Conversely, if P i ∩ int△ 6= ∅, let pi ∈ P i∩ int △, then
pi ∈ int P˜ i. If ti = 1, then int P˜ i =int P i.
To prove assertion 3, the set of no-arbitrage prices for the economy
∩
i
Si = ∩
i
int coneP˜ i = cone ∩
i
intP˜ i
The last assertion follows from assertions 2 and 3.
6.6 Proof of corollary 1
To prove assertion 1 that allows for risk neutral agents, if ti < 1, let Zi be
constant in (10) with ai < ui′(zis) < b
i. We obtain that intP i ⊆ intP˜ i. Hence
∩iint Pi 6= ∅ imply ∩iint P˜i 6= ∅. From proposition 4, assertion 3, ∩iS
i 6= ∅.
To prove the second assertion, from proposition 2 assertion 3, int P˜ i =int△,
therefore Si = int Rk+ for all i and ∩iS
i =int Rk+.
6.7 Proof of lemma 2
Assume on the contrary that for any l, there exists pi(l) ∈ P such that pi(l)l > 0.
Let λ ∈ int △. Then ν =
∑
s λspi(s) ∈ P∩ int△, a contradiction.
6.8 Proof of proposition 5
We first characterize riP˜ .
Lemma 6 Let V fulﬁll (3) with t < 1. Then p ∈riP˜ if and only
∃pi ∈ P ∩ ri△GP ,∃Z ∈ R
k,∀s ∈ GP , a < u
′(zs) < b, and ps =
pisu
′(zs)
Epiu′(Z)
If t = 0, then ri P˜ = ri △GP .
Proof : Observe that, p ∈ ri P˜ iff pl > 0 iff l ∈ GP , hence pil > 0 iff l ∈ GP .
Without loss of generality, one can assume that GP = Ω and be reduced to
lemma 5.
Let us now prove proposition 5. The proofs of assertions 1 and 3 which follow
from Allouch et al [1] are similar to those of proposition 3 assertions 1 and 2
in Dana and Le Van [14] changing P i into P˜ i for all i. The second assertion
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follows from lemma 6.
Let us prove that ∩iS
i
w 6= ∅ implies that GP i = GP j for any i, j. Indeed
∆G
Pi
= ∆G
Pj
if and only if GP i = GP j . Furthermore ∆GPi 6= ∆GPj if and
only if ri∆G
Pi
∩ ri∆G
Pj
= ∅. Indeed if pi ∈ ri∆G
Pi
∩ ri∆G
Pj
, then pis >
0,∀s ∈ GP i ∪ GP j and
∑
s∈∆ pis ≥
∑
s∈G
Pi
∪G
Pj
pis >
∑
s∈G
Pi
pis = 1, hence a
contradiction. The converse is obvious. Hence ∩iS
i
w 6= ∅ implies ∆GPi = ∆GPj .
The remaining part of the proposition follows directly from lemma 6.
6.9 Proof of corollary 2
From assertion 2 of proposition 5 with pi = pii and Z constant,we obtain that
riPi ⊆riP˜
i which proves the first assertion. To prove the second, ri P˜ i =ri△G.
Hence Siw =cone ri△G for all i and ∩iS
i
w =cone ri△G.
6.10 Proof of lemma 3
Let V fulfill (4) and have no half-line. Then for every X ∈ Rk and W 6= 0
useful, there exists λ ≥ 0 such that
0 < V (X + λW )− V (X) ≤ Epi(X + λW −X) = λEpi(W )
for any pi ∈ P (X). Hence pi is a no-arbitrage price. From corollary ??,
P (X) ⊆intP for any X ∈ Rk. Conversely assume that P (X) ⊆intP or equiv-
alently that any pi ∈ P (X) is a no-arbitrage price for any X ∈ Rk and that
there is a half-line. Then there exists X ∈ Rk and W 6= 0 useful such that
V (X + λW ) = V (X) for all λ ≥ 0. Let piλ ∈ P (X + λW ). We then have
0 ≥ Epiλ(X + λW −X) = λEpiλ(W )
contradicting the fact that piλ is a no-arbitrage price.
Assume that V fulfill (3) and that V has a half-line. Then there exists X ∈ Rk
and W 6= 0 useful such that V (X + λW ) = V (X) for all λ ≥ 0. Let piλ ∈
P (X + λW ). We then have
0 ≥ Epiλ(u(X + λW )− u(X)) ≥ Epiλ(u
′(X + λW )λW )
Since W is useful, from proposition 3, Epiλ(u
′(X + λW )λW ) ≥ 0, hence
Epiλ(u
′(X + λW )W ) = 0
Assume now that P (X) ⊆int△ for any X ∈ Rk. Since piλ ⊆int△ and u
′ > 0,
W+ 6= 0 and W− 6= 0. If a < u
′(x) or u′(x) < b for all x, then we have
0 > aEpiλ(W+)− bEpiλ(W−) contradicting (9) of remark 1.
Let us now show that if V has no-half line, then P (X) ⊆int△ for any X ∈ Rk.
Indeed if V has no-half line, for any X ∈ Rk and any W ∈ Rk useful, there
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exists λ > 0 such that 0 < V (X + λW ) − V (X). Thus for any pi ∈ P (X), we
have
0 < V (X + λW )− V (X) ≤ Epi(u
′(X)λW )
Hence Epi(u
′(X)W ) > 0 for any W useful in particular for any W ≥ 0, W 6= 0.
Hence pi is strictly positive. If V fulfills (2), then any pi ∈ P fulfills pi ∈
P (a), a ∈ R, hence P ⊆int△ .
Assume that V (X) = Epi(u(X). From assertion 2, pi ∈int△ and no risk neu-
trality is a sufficient condition for no half-line. From assertion 3, if V has no
half-line, then pi ∈int△ and Epi(u
′(X)W ) > 0 for any non zero useful vector
W and any X ∈ Rk. If there is risk neutrality at infinity, then there exists c, d
such that u′(x) = b for all x ∈]−∞, d] and u′(x) = a for all x ∈ [c,∞[. Thus
we must have
aEpi(W+)− bEpi(W−) > 0, for allW 6= 0useful
However any W 6= 0 such that aEpi(W+)− bEpi(W−) = 0 is useful and violates
the strict inequality, hence we obtain a contradiction.
6.11 Proof of lemma 4
If L = {0}, we are brought down to Lemma 3. So, let us assume that L 6= {0}.
1. From proposition 1, intP = ∅ and P ⊂ △GP . Assertion 1 follows from the
argument of assertion 1 of lemma 3 replacing W ∈ R by W ∈ R − {L}, int by
ri.
2. From assertion 2 of proposition 4, P∩ int△ = ∅. This implies that P ⊂ △GP .
Assume W is a halfline. Then there exists X ∈ Rk and W 6= 0 useful such that
V (X + λW ) = V (X) for all λ ≥ 0. Let piλ ∈ P (X + λW ). We then have
0 ≥ Epiλ(u(X + λW )− u(X)) ≥ Epiλ(u
′(X + λW )λW )
Since W is useful, from proposition 3, Epiλ(u
′(X + λW )λW ) ≥ 0, hence
Epiλ(u
′(X + λW )W ) = 0
By the argument of assertion 2 of lemma 3, we obtain that ws = 0, ∀s ∈ GP ,
hence W ∈ L. In other words, there are no weak half-lines.
6.12 Existence of equilibrium theorems
6.12.1 A review of existence of equilibrium theorems
In order to prove propositions 6 and 7, we start this section by recalling two
theorems on existence of equilibrium with short-selling.
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Theorem 1 Let V i fulﬁll (3) for each i. Then the following assertions are
equivalent:
1. ∩
i
Si 6= ∅
2. NUBA is fulﬁlled,
3. the set of individually rational attainable allocations A is compact.
Any of the previous assertions implies any of the following assertions:
4. there exists an individually rational eﬃcient allocation for any distribution
of initial endowments,
5. there exists an equilibrium for any distribution of initial endowments.
If V i has no half-line for every i, then assertions 1-5 are equivalent and furthe-
more, any equilibrium price is a no-arbitrage price.
Proof : See e.g. Page and Wooders [36], Dana et al [12].
Theorem 2 Let V i fulﬁll (3) for each i. Then the following assertions are
equivalent.
1. ∩
i
Siw 6= ∅
2. WNMA is fulﬁlled.
Any of the previous assertions implies any of the following assertions:
3. The individually rational utility set U is compact,
4. there exists an individually rational eﬃcient allocation for any distribution
of initial endowments,
5. there exists an equilibrium for any distribution of initial endowments.
If V i has no weak half-line for every i, then assertions 1-5 are equivalent and
furthemore, any equilibrium price is a no-arbitrage price.
Proof : See e.g. Page et al [35], Allouch et al [1].
Theorem 1 obviously make stronger requirements than theorem 2. It is
particularly useful when the utilities are strictly concave.
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6.12.2 Strict concavity of V
We now provide necessary and sufficient condition for V that fulfill (3) to be
strictly concave.
Lemma 7 Let V fulﬁll (3). Then V is strictly concave if and only if P (X) ⊆int△
for any X ∈ Rk and u is strictly concave. If V fulﬁlls(2), then V is strictly
concave if and only if u is strictly concave and P ⊆int△.
Proof : Let us prove that if P (X) ⊆int△ for any X ∈ Rk and u is strictly
concave, then V is strictly concave. Indeed, let X,Y ∈ Rk, X 6= Y, λ ∈]0, 1[
and pi ∈ P (λX + (1− λ)Y ). We then have
V (λX + (1− λ)Y ) = Epi(u(λX + (1− λ)Y )) + c(pi)
> λEpi(u(X)) + (1− λ)Epi(u(Y )) + c(pi)
≥ λV (X) + (1− λ)V (Y ),
proving the desired assertion. Conversely if V is strictly concave, then restrict-
ing attention to constants, we first obtain that u is strictly concave. As V has
no half-line, from the proof of lemma 3, we obtain that P (X) ⊆int△ for any
X ∈ Rk. Clearly if V fulfills (2), P ⊆int△.
6.13 Proof of proposition 8
The proof of assertion 1 is as that of assertion 1 of proposition 1 in Dana and
Le Van [14]. We now prove assertion 2. Assume on the contrary that there
exists an efficient allocation (Xi)mi=1 for some distribution of endowments and a
feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wm which satisfy Epi(W
i) > 0 for all i and pi ∈ P˜ i. For
any i, for any pii ∈ P i and Zi ∈ Rk , we have∑
s
piisu
i′(zis)w
i
s > 0.
In particular, we have, for any pi ∈ argmin pi∈P iEpi(u
i(Xi +W i)) + ci(pi),
V i(Xi +W i)− V i(Xi) ≥ Epiiu
i′(Xi +W i)W i > 0
contradicting the Pareto optimality of (Xi)mi=1.
To prove assertion 3, let (Ei)mi=1 be fixed. For any (z
i) ∈ U((Ei)mi=1), there
exists (X1,X2, ...,Xm) ∈ A((Ei)mi=1) such that
V i(Ei) ≤ zi ≤ V i(Xi), for all i. (15)
25
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2008.39 (Version révisée)
From assertion 1, if there exist an efficient allocation, there exists p˜i ∈ ∩
i
P˜ i.
Hence there exists (X¯i, pii) with pii ∈ P i such that p˜ij :=
ui
′
(x¯ij)pi
i
j
E
pii
(ui′ (X¯i))
for all i.
Let us show that if (X1,X2, ...,Xm) ∈ A((Ei)mi=1), then Ep˜i(X
i) is bounded.
We first show that it is bounded below. Indeed
V i(Xi) = min
P i
Epiu
i(Xi) + ci(pi) ≤ Epiiu
i(Xi) + ci(pii)
≤ Epii(u
i(X¯i)) + Epii
(
ui
′
(X¯i)(Xi − X¯i)
)
+ ci(pii)
= Epii(u
i(X¯i) + Epii(u
i′(X¯i))Ep˜i(X
i − X¯i) + ci(pii)
Thus,
mi =
V i(Ei)− ci(pii)− Epii(u
i(X¯i))
Epiiu
i′(X¯i)
+ Ep˜i(X¯
i) ≤ Ep˜i(X
i).
Since for all i, Ep˜i(X
i) is bounded below by mi, it is bounded above by
M i = Ep˜i(E)−
∑
l 6=im
l. From (15), we thus have
zi ≤ V i(Xi) ≤ Epii(u
i(X¯i)) + (M i − Ep˜iX¯
i)Epiiu
i′(X¯i) + ci(pii) for all i
and U((Ei)mi=1) is bounded.
6.14 Proof of proposition 10
The first assertion is proven as in the proof of proposition 8 assertion 1. The
equivalence between the two assertions follows from Samet [40] since P˜ i(X¯i) is
compact for every i.
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